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Shannon Kathleen O'Byrne* Public Power and Private
Obligation: An Analysis of
the Government Contract
I. Introduction
This paper analyzes contracts made by the Government' in terms of
political theory.2 From this perspective, it explores the assumptions,
utility, and accuracy of the private law model which historically has
governed the Government's liability in contract.3 The paper's overarching
*Shannon Kathleen O'Byme, Sessional Lecturer, Faculty.of Business, University of Alberta,
Edmonton, AB. I wish to thank James F. McGinnis of the Edmonton law firm of Parlee
McLaws as well as Professor David Percy of the Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, for
providing useful commentary on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. This paper focuses on contracts entered into by the executive arm of Government - that is,
Crown contracts. The term "Crown contracts" will not appear here however. For several
reasons, I will instead refer to "State contracts" or "Government contracts." First, as the Law
Reform Commission of Canada has pointed out, there is considerable confusion regarding
what "Crown" signifies. See its report The Legal Status of the Federal Administration
(Working Paper No. 40) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985), at 24-26.
Second, "Crown"is unnecessarily outdated and monarchical. Seediscussion on this by theLaw
Reform Commission of Canada, at 5, and by David Cohen, "Thinking about the State: Law
Reform and the Crown in Canada" (1987), 24 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 379-404 at 383.
Third, by avoiding the word "Crown" one eliminates an unhelpful legal fiction. As Lord
Diplock pointed out in Town Investments Ltd. v. Department of Environment [1978] A.C. 359
at 380-381: "to continue nowadays to speak of 'the Crown' as doing legislative or executive
acts of government, which, in reality as distinct from legal fiction, are decided on and done by
human beings other then the Queen herself, involves the risk of confusion."
2. While this approach gaining more adherents, it is still not common to analyze administrative
law in terms of theory. As Patrick McAuslan notes in "Administrative Law and Administrative
Theory: The Dismal Performance of Administrative Lawyers" (1978), 9 Cambrian Law
Review 40, there are several reasons for this, including, at 42, constraints that emanate from
the profession:
The profession is suspicious of theory; academics are, in the practising profession's
eyes, too theoretical and the way to win professional acclaim is to denigrate theory.
Instead of standing up to the profession and explaining and justifying the role of theory
and philosophy in administrative law, most administrative lawyers are slightly shame-
faced about their interest in the subject.
3. Given the magnitude of the State's contractual presence in the marketplace, the suitability
of the model determining its liability becomes an increasingly important question. According
to S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement and Judicial Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1988)
at 29, public sector procurement by the federal government alone amounted to an estimated
$73.6 billion in 1984. She notes at 29, footnotes 9 and 10, that the value ofcommercial contracts
entered into by Crown corporations approached $14.4 billion, with procurement expenditures
of $4.23 billion. These figures by themselves demonstrate the presence of a truly dominating
force in the Canadian marketplace and confirm that the days of a limited Canadian State - if
ever they existed - are long gone now. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada points out,
supra, note 1 at 52:
The State has ceased to besimply theprovider and guarantorof a liberal order: its is also
responsible for performing a host of services which have considerably altered the nature
of its functions. ... Academic opinion is unanimous in noting the transition from a
"Watchdog State" to a "Welfare State."
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objective is to question the propriety of applying private law principles
to a public entity, particularly within the context of liberal democratic
values to which both the Canadian State and society are pledged.4 In
accord with McAuslan, it regards theoretical inquiry as significant.5 It
asserts that if the current model of State liability collides with fundamen-
tal Canadian political constructs, or falls into descriptive inaccuracy, or
generates false conclusions, the model ought to be replaced with a more
competent one.
Part II of this paper sets out the private law model of contract. Part I
assesses the premise behind applying this model to the State contract,
namely, that the State has a workable private analogue. Part IV evaluates
the ability of the private law model to account for the law governing the
State contract as well as its compatibility with liberal democratic theory.
And finally, Part V weighs the model's success in protecting the interests
of the contracting individual.6
II. The Private Law Model
Government liability in contract has historically been determined by
private law. It is agreed that - subject to legislation and prerogative
powers - the Government has a common law power to contract,7 is bound
as if it were an individual, 8 has a "duty to abide by and obey the law"9 in
all its parts, and enjoys no common law immunity from liability for
breach.'0 As Lord Watson asserts in Windsor and Annapolis Rwy. Co. v.
The Queen:
4. See the Law Reform Commission of Canada's discussion of Canadian liberalism, supra
note 1 at 42-51. For a very recent and insightful account of the nature of Canadian State and
society, see A. Cairns, "The Past and Future of the Canadian Administrative State," (1990) 40
University of Toronto Law Journal 319-361. See, in addition, Cairns's "The Embedded State:
State-Society Relations in Canada" in Keith Banting, ed., State and Society: Canada in
Comparative Perspective (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) at 53.
5. McAuslan, supra, note 2 at 40-49.
6. Note that throughout this paper, I will for ease of reference refer to the individual contracting
with the State, bearing in mind that corporations also do so.
7. Attorney General of Quebec v. Labrecque, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1057 at 1082.
8. Bank of Montreal v. Attorney General for Quebec, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 565 at 573-574.
9. Per Sir George Farwell in The Eastern Trust Company v. McKenzie, Mann & Co., [1915]
A.C. 750 at 759 (J.C., on appeal from the S.C.C.). The duty to abide by the law is placed on
the Crown and "every branch of the Executive."
10. See Thomas v. The Queen (1874), L.R. 10 Q.B. 31 which provides that a petition of right
for unliquidated damages would lie against the Crown for breach of contract; referred to with
approval in The Queen v. Murray, [1965] 2Ex.C.R. 663 at668-669, affirmed (1967), 60D.L.R.
(2d) 647 (S.C.C.).
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it must now be regarded as settled law that, whenever a valid contract has
been made between the Crown and a subject, a petition of right will lie for
damages resulting from a breach of that contract by the Crown."
Absent statutory restriction to the contrary, even ordinary rules of agency
apply,12 meaning that the Government can be contractually bound through
the actual or ostensible agency of its Ministers 3 or its public officers.' 4
The Government is taken to be just like - or just about like - anyone else.
The strategy of treating the Government as if it had a private analogue
is both political and historical. Politically, the goal is to protect the
individual from overarching State power, to reconcile, on the one hand,
the conflict between the individual sovereignty of each citizen - derived
from liberal democratic theory - with the reality of an institutional and
coercive State, on the other. 5 Reliance on a private law model of State
liability thereby combines the liberal idea of maximizing liberty with the
objective of attaining a fair outcome in legal contests between individual
and State.
16
Historically, the private law strategy conforms with a central and
constitutionally enshrined, liberal democratic tenet, namely the Rule of
Law.' 7 While the Rule of Law is essentially a "contested concept,"I8 it has
11. (1886),11A.C. 607 at613, quoted with approval bytheSupremeCourtofCanadainBank
of Montreal, supra, note 8 at 573.
12. Verreaultv.AttorneyGeneralfor Quebec [1977] 1 S.C.R.41 at 46-47; The Queen v. CAE
Industries Ltd. (1985), 20 D.L.R. (4th) 347 at 373-374 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C.
refused (1985), 20 D.L.R. (4th) 347n.
13. A.G. of Canada v. Newfield Seed Ltd. (1989), 63 D.L.R. (4th) 644 at 660 (Sask. C.A.) and
The Queen v. Transworld Shipping Ltd. (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3rd) 304 at 307 (Fed. C.A.).
14. Transworld, ibid at 308, referring with approval to Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of
Works, [194312 All E.R. 560 at 563. A public officer is one whose fills a statutory office, per
Sumnerv. Chandler, [1878] 18 N.B.R. 175 at 185 (C.A.), or one who is appointed to discharge
a public duty and is paid by the Crown to do so, per Smith v. Christie, [1920] 3 W.W.R. 585
at 591-592 (Alta. S.C.A.D.). As the court in Carltona at 308 points out, no Minister could
personally attend to all his or her administrative responsibilities and so
duties imposed upon ministers and thepowers given to ministers are normally exercised
under the authority of the minister by responsible officials of the department. Public
business could not be carried on if that were not the case.
15. See Quentin Skinner's discussion of the conflict between individual autonomy and State
power in "The State" in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989), 90-131 at 122.
16. See H. Collins, The Law of Contract (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986) at 1
where he identifies the "latent social ideal" of contract law to be the maximization of individual
liberty.
17. The preamble to Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) (The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms) provides that Canada is founded on "principles that recognize the
supremacy of God and the rule of law."
18. M.J Radin, "Reconsidering the Rule of Law" (1989), 69 Boston University Law Review
781 at 791.
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a relatively stable judicial meaning in Canada. Indeed, the Supreme Court
of Canada has expressly affirmed the historical and constitutional impor-
tance of the Rule of Law, defining it as "conveying, for example, a sense
of orderliness, of subjection to known legal rules and of executive
accountability to legal authority."'9
The Rule of Law - the same Rule of Law - applies to both individual
and State. This accords with Dicey's late nineteenth-century pronounce-
ment that no person is "above the law, but (what is a different thing)...
[everyone] ... of whatever rank or condition is subject to the ordinary law
of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals."20
Subjecting the State to the private law of contract thereby conforms to "a
widely-held political ideal,"'" by constraining the arbitrary exercise of
State power.2 In short, the common law protects individual autonomy
from sovereign power by declining to recognize the State's status as
governor when it is in the contractual arena.
This private law strategy - while powered by objectives closely tied to
liberal democratic theory - is nonetheless problematic. There are two
important objections. The first relates to the premise behind the strategy:
it assumes that the State is like the individual and has a private analogue,
19. ReLanguageRightsundertheManitobaAct,1870(1985), 19D.L.R. (4th) 1 at23 (S.C.C.)
quoting with approval its earlier pronouncement in Reference re Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of Canada (nos. 1,2,3) (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 46.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the debate between theorists who regard the Rule
of Law instrumentally - such as J. Raz, "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue" in Joseph Raz, The
Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) - and those
who regard it substantively, such as F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960). For a useful summary of the varying positions, see M.J.
Radin ibid. Note too, the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Language Rights under the Manitoba
Act, 1870 has expressly favoured Raz's approach, at 23.
20. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed.) (London:
MacMillan & Co. Ltd. 1964) at 193, first published in 1885.
21. P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 2.
Note that while Dicey is traditionally invoked in support of a system which makes the State
responsible, pursuant to the ordinary law, for its tortious and contractual conduct, Dicey was
not in favour of such a proposition. As Cohen points out, it was Dicey's position that the State
should have not legal status at all - that individual bureaucrats should bear personal liability.
See Cohen, supra, note I at 389-390.
22. Liberal theory regards State power suspiciously and requires constraint on its exercise to
avoid results contrary to the Rule of Law, including arbitrariness. See J. Gray, Concepts in
Social Thought: Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1986) at 74. See too D.
Hartle's assertion inPublicPolicy andDecision Making andRegulation (Toronto: Butterworths,
1979) at 44, that the State has a vital role
as the ultimate rule maker and rule enforcer that can and does, by changing the rules,
affect all of the sources of well-being of all individuals directly or indirectly, for good
or for ill.
Quoted with approval by Alan Cairns, "The Past and Future of the Canadian Administrative
State," supra, note 4 at 320, n. 3
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thereby permitting- in theory at least- application of aprivate law model
of liability. I propose to explore this assumption in the next section. The
second objection concerns the model's competence to account for the
current state of the law. I will turn to this matter in Part IV.
II. The Feasibility of the Private Law Model and its Analogue
Treitel provides the following definition of a contract: "A contract is an
agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognized by
law." 3 An agreement, in turn, implies at least three elements which are
particularly germane to an analysis of the State contract. First, it implies
freedom of contract - that parties are empowered to strike any bargain
they please. This is a tempered freedom of contract, of course, as modem
contract theory rejects the classicists' world of "totally autonomous
individuals, free to transact on any terms ... and thereby to control their
own destinies". 24 Instead, it selects the image of "relatively autonomous
individuals transacting in an environment regulated by trade custom and
state intervention that alleviates the most extreme hardships of the
market."25 Itis within this latter context26 that freedom of contract remains
a private law value. Second, an agreement implies some measure of
equality in bargaining power between the parties so as to define the line
between true consent and "a state of mind which cannot properly be
described as consent at all."'27 Third, it requires both finality and closure
as contractual obligations are concluded at a single point in time:
"generally speaking, an agreement is made when one party accepts an
offer made by the other."28 Itis at this moment that the deal is set, the terms
defined; it is from such a vantage point that one assesses mutual
obligations and so what constitutes breach. Events, words, and obliga-
tions originating before or after this critical moment are, as a general
proposition, of no legal consequence.
To apply these three elements to the Government contract, one must
first establish that the individual and State are largely equivalent in the
23. Treitel, G. H., The Law of Contract (8th ed.) (London: Stevens & Sons, 1991) at 1.
24. J. Feinman,"The Significance of Contract LawTheory", [1990] 58 Cincinnati L.R. 1283
at 1309-1310.
25. Ibid, at 1310. Treitel points out that there are now statutory regimes which regulate the
terms and conditions of many important contractual relationships, supra, note 23 at 2-5, and
this reduces the scope of classically conceived freedom of contract. See too P.S. Atiyah, The
Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
Note that Feinman rejects both the classical and modem theories of contract because, among
other matters, they do not recognize their own ideological perspectives, ibid., at 1309-1310.
26. Feinman, ibid, at 1286.
27. Treitel, supra, note 23 at 3.
28. Ibid, at 8.
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market place - that the State is competent to have a workable private
analogue. Related to this point is the necessity of showing that the State
contract can be competently analyzed in ferms of the private law ingre-
dients outlined above and further, that such an analysis is consistent with
liberal democratic theory. Compatibility with theory is important be-
cause a model of State liability ought not to conflict with Canadian values
and its liberal democratic heritage. Finally, for the analogue to survive,
there must be evidence that State defences to liability are comparable to
those available to the ordinary individual. I propose to consider each of
these matters in turn.
1. The Analogical Premise
a. The liberal democratic perspective
In this section, I will briefly introduce two elements derived from political
theory which render the State fundamentally different from the indi-
vidual, even within a contractual relationship, namely its coercive re-
sources and duties of governance.
i. The State's coercive resources
The fact of State power persists even in a liberal democratic society
which elevates the Rule of Law. Put briefly, the principle of Parliamen-
tary sovereignty means that the State is never entirely subject to law29 and
so is fundamentally unlike the individual. State power means that the
State has coercive resources from which the individual requires protec-
tion.30 It means that the State is "a monopolist of legitimate force."'" In
short, within the context of a liberal democracy, the State embraces
a double system of power. It is a system by which people can be governed,
that is, made to do things they would not otherwise do, and made to refrain
from doing things they otherwise might do. Democracy as a system of
government is, then, a system by which power is exerted by the state over
individuals and groups within it.32
Still, it does remain rare for the State to force the individual into a
contractual relationship. On this basis, therefore, one could argue that the
fact of State power remains largely irrelevant in the market-place. Yet it
must be remembered that when the State and individual agree to certain
29. T. Prosser, "Towards a Critical Public Law" (1982), 9 Journal of Law and Society 1-19,
at 7.
30. Mr. Justice Sopinka notes that the role of the Charter is to protect the individual "against
the coercive power of the state." See McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229
at 444.
31. Skinner, supra, note 15 at 107.
32. C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation, 1965) at 4. See too discussion by the Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra,
note I at 61-65.
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contractual provisions, the commitment each gives is essentially differ-
ent. This is because the State retains its identity even when submitting to
the private law and is never stripped of its extraordinary resources.
Rather, in entering the market, it elects in a non-binding way to place
those resources in abeyance; it has a legal alter-ego to which it can revert.
The individual, by way of contrast, is fully and finally bound.
ii. The State's duties of governance
Of course, it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a thorough
account of the State's obligations pursuant to liberal democratic theory.33
I do propose to offer, however, some general comments.
Among other matters, liberalism requires the State to show a solemn
regard for the human person and manifest respect for individual au-
tonomy. 34 At the same time - and this is clearly a competing principle -
the State is required to act in the public interest.35 One of the State's central
obligations in this latter category is to ensure the presence of justice in the
community for, as Dworkin points out, individual autonomy is not
possible in an unjust community. And while there may be disagreement
as to what justice may require, there is, at least, a shared understanding
that
politics is a joint venture in a particularly strong sense: that everyone, of
every conviction and economic level, has a personal stake - a strong
personal stake for someone with a lively sense of his [sic] critical interests
- in justice not only for himself but for everyone else as well. That
understanding provides a powerful bond underlying even the most heated
argument over particular policies and principles.3 6
Because an unjust community hinders the individual in pursuing the good
life, each of us "shares that powerful reason for wanting our community
to be a just one. ' 37 As Dworkin concludes:
our success or failure in leading the lives people like us should have, are
in that limited but powerful way parasitic on our success together in
33. Liberal democratic theory does not embrace a single perspective. As Gray notes, supra,
note 22 at x, liberalism regards itself as tolerant and meliorist. In this way, liberalism does the
very thing it seeks to describe by defying the possibility of autocratic pronouncements
regarding what it entails.
34. Liberalism is constructed on the notion of respect for individual autonomy. See Gray,
ibid.; J. Blum "Critical Legal Studies and the Rule of Law" (1990), 38 University of Buffalo
Law Review 59 at 120 and Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and
Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) at 39.
35. For example, the State is only entitled to exercise its power to contract in fulfilment of the
common good. See my discussion, infra at 12-14.
36. R. Dworkin, "Liberal Community" (1989), 77 California Law Review 479-504 at 501-
502.
37. Ibid., at 504.
492 The Dalhousie Law Journal
politics. Political community has that ethical primacy over our individual
lives.38
The Government's duties of governance - including the matters
discussed above - argue against an individual-State analogue and this
even in the market-place. Because it is the State's job to ensure the
presence of justice in the community, to respect its role as lawmaker,39 to
guarantee a liberal order,40 as well as to exercise its powers in the interests
of the common good, the State must always have due regard for the
quality of its actions. For, without integrity and consistency of State
conduct, an intolerable contradiction would emerge between "idea and
conduct," between "form and practice in public life." '4
The individual's contractual behaviour, on the other hand, is not
similarly constrained. Indeed, and a matter I will return to in the next
section of this paper, it is a hallmark of democratic liberalism to minimize
formal demands on the individual because he or she occupies a qualified
position of primacy over the collective 42 and because liberalism main-
tains "a more or less neutral stance with regard to permissible patterns of
social life. 43
b. The common law perspective
Though the private law model claims that the State is contractually bound
as if it were an individual,44 a review of British and Canadian case law,
dating back to the eighteenth-century, reveals judicial recognition that
the State differs from the individual in basic, unbridgeable ways. While
it must be emphasized that this case law does not constitute a large body,
it is nonetheless important for identifying legally significant differences
between the State and individual and this even in a commercial setting.
As early as 1786, in the decision of Macbeath v. Haldimand,45 Lord
Mansfield stated that when a Crown servant enters into a contract, there
is, as a general proposition, no personal liability: "we cannot argue from
the nature of private agreements .... The presumption is that the public
38. Ibid.
39. See Northern Territority ofAus. v. Skywest Pty. (1987), 48 N.T.R. 20 at 46.
40. Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 1 at 52.
41. K. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and an Institution
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980) at 6.
42. J. Gray, supra, note 22 at x.
43. Collins, supra, note 16 at 1.
44. See Bank of Montreal, supra, note 8.
45. 1 T.R. 181.
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faith, or justice of the Crown is always relied upon."'46 A nineteenth-
century textbook writer, quoted with approval in the 1878 decision of
Sumner v. Chandler, also invokes a value laden presumption regarding
the standard of behaviour expected from the State when an agent seeks to
contract on its behalf:
The natural presumption .. is that the contract was made upon the credit
and responsibility of the government itself, as possessing an entire ability
to fulfil all its just contracts far beyond that of any private man; and that
it is ready to fulfil them not only with good faith, but with punctilious
promptitude, and in the spirit of liberal courtesy.47
In 1920, a Canadian court even enforced a Government apprenticeship
contract which it otherwise would have found t6be too obscure, it said,
had only individuals been involved.48 The presence of the Crown as the
other contracting party allayed any concern that the apprentice involved
would have been made unreasonably vulnerable under the contract. In the
Court's opinion, "it must be assumed that the Crown, acting by a
responsible minister, will deal fairly and justly."49
Considerably more recently, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a 1990
decision 0 emphasized some of the distinctive interests which the State
represents in a contractual dispute:
The Crown represents the state. It constitutes the means by which the
federal aspect of our Canadian society functions. It must represent the
interests of all members of Canadian society in court claims- brought
against the Crown in right of Canada. The interests and obligations of the
Crown are vastly different from those of private litigants making claims
against the federal government.51
There is evenjudicial reflection-from an Australian Court- on the link
between government conduct in the contractual arena and the Rule of
46. Ibid at 185. One finds a parallel pronouncement in the decision of Hopkins v. Mehoffey
(1824) 11 Serge & Rawle lZ6 at 128:
In general, it is true, that there is a distinction between contracts that are entered into on
the part of government, by its agents, and those which are entered into on the part of
individuals or corporations, by those who represent them. In respect of the first... the
publicfaith is exclusively relied on, whenever the agent does not speedily renderhimself
liable.
47. Story on Agency (8th ed.), quoted in Sumner, supra, note 14 at 186-187.
48. R. v. Novak, [1920] 1 W.W.R. 136 at 137 (Man.C.A.).
49. Ibid. Whether this case continues to be good law is questionable - I cite it only as an
example of a judicial attitude.
50. Rudolph Wolff& Co. v. The Queen (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 392 (S.C.C.).
51. Ibid. at 397.
On the basis that "the Crown cannot be equated with an individual," the Court upheld the
constitutionality of legislation giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction on claims against
the Crown, ibid.
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Law. As the Court in Northern Territory of Aust. v. Skywest Pty. Ltd.
observes:
A government is not only a party to a contract; through its control of
Parliarfient it is a lawmaker. In that capacity it has an interest in ensuring
that people respect and observe the law, and to do so it must display by its
actions some minimum respect for its own rules. For it is in the public
interest that when a government contracts with an ordinary person, it deals
fairly with that person and is seen to do so.5 2
The Court implies that more is expected from the State in a contractual
context because more is at risk should it disregard it obligations and treat
the individual unfairly, namely, social respect for the Rule of Law 3
Macbeath and other decisions like it,54 suggest that some of the
principles derived from commercial practice are misplaced when the
contractual principal is the State. The decisions in Novak and SkywestPty
intimate that the contractual presence of the State calls for a similar
modulation - this because the State can be relied upon to be less
combative, less obstructive,55 and more reasonable than the ordinary
individual. These Courts assume that the Crown has an extra-legal
obligation to do the right thing, to "do ample justice to the plaintiff's
demand if it be well founded," '56 and so, indirectly at least, expect no less
of it. While their assumptions are never expressly tied back to the liberal
democratic quality of the State's obligations as governor, the courts do
see it as an entity which can be trusted to be fair and just even if it were
entitled to be otherwise by contract or operation of law. And the Courts
52. Supra note 39 at 46.
53. Ibid.
54. Sumner v. Chandler, supra note 14; Hopkins v. Mehoffey, supra note 46.
55. For example, according to the Court in Deare v. Attorney General (1835), 1 Y & C 197
at 209:
It has been the practice which I hope never will be discontinued, for officers of the
Crown to throw no difficulty in the way of any proceedings for the purpose of bringing
matters before a Court ofjustice where any real point of difficulty that requires judicial
decision has occurred.
This quotation has been referred to with approval in The Eastern Trust Company v. McKenzie,
Mann & Co., supra, note 9 at 760.
56. Macbeath, supra, note 45.
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are willing to enforce the State's solemn obligation to act in the public
interest even within the context of a contractual dispute.57
In giving legal significance to the State's duties of governance, the
forgoing cases accord with liberal political theory and so run counter to
the private law model of State liability. They expressly recognize that the
State has more and different obligations than the individual has in the
same setting.
2. Conclusion
Thus far, I have attempted to show - in a general way - that both the
coercive resources and public duties of the State make it fundamentally
different from the individual. 8 This fact is easily lost sight of because the
private law model, in pursuit of a paradoxical strategy to protect indi-
vidual autonomy, must insist on the presence of an analogue.59 Accord-
ingly, whether the State can be likened to the individual is not generally
a matter of judicial inquiry - it is the accepted starting point. But the
starting point is nonetheless inaccurate. To demonstrate this contention
in greater detail, the next section of this paper will explore examples of
how the private law model fails to account for the State contract and how,
therefore, it analogical assumption founders.
IV. The Accuracy of the Private Law Model
The private law model seeks to absorb the primary differences between
individual and State but it cannot consistently accomplish that task. First,
to do so would be entirely contrary to basic principles of a liberal
57. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada in Rudolph Wolff, supra, note 50,
leaves open the possibility that where the Crown's activities "are indistinguishable from those
of any other litigant engaged in a commercial activity," a section 15 Charter comparison might
be "just and appropriate," at 397. The opening left here, however, is very small indeed because
the Supreme Court of Canada has appliedRudolph Wolffto a case involving what would appear
to be an extremely commercial matter - a contract to repair a wharf in Nova Scotia. See R. v.
Dywidag Systems International et al (1990), 40 C.L.R. 1 at 4 (S.C.C.).
It could be argued that the Government's activity in Dywidag was not purely commercial as
its contractual obligations were incurred for the benefit of the people of Nova Scotia. If this
argument is correct, then there can be no real exception to th6 principle in Rudolph Wolff& Co.
because all Government contracts must be entered into for the public good. See infra at 496.
If this is true, then there exists high judicial recognition that the State is intrinsically different
from the contracting individual even in highly - if not fully - commercial matters.
58. Accord Cohen who writes supra, note 1 at 381, that:
The state (or community) has no private analogue, and, in developing legal concepts and
a public policy of the state, we should not carry with us the conceptual baggage of
another era, designed to deal with other problems.
59. As discussed earlier in this paper, the assumption is that, in order to protect the individual
from overarching State power, the law should deny any formal recognition of the identity of
the State when it is in the contractual arena.
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democracy. Second- and this is a related point- application of the model
is already modified by public law principles derived from liberal demo-
cratic theory, on the one hand, and feudal incidents of prerogative powers,
on the other. These principles are not formally organized nor are their
limits judicially explored because they are seen as exceptions to the
general rule. Nonetheless, they distinguish the State contract from legal
agreements between individuals and so compromise the operation of the
private law model. Indeed, as I will discuss in this section, the State
contract is not governed by private law elements alone but by an
unstructured array of constitutional, administrative, and contractual
principles in addition to the incidents of sovereignty found in the Crown's
legislative, common law, and prerogative powers.
1. Freedom of Contract
The private model of contract assumes that the State and individual share
a parallel -if not identical - freedom to contract. The assumption, in turn,
raises two questions. First, does liberal democratic theory recognize
unique constraints on the State's freedom to contract and second, are
there any judicially acknowledged limitations imposed on the State
contract which contradict the basis of the model?
a. Liberal democratic theory
As already discussed, liberal democratic theory obligates the State both
to preserve individual autonomy and to act in the interests of the public
good. As these duties are both mandatory and general, the State is
required to respect its relationship with the individual and society at large
even when a named individual and the State interact in other ways -
including contractual ones. Neither the antecedent individual-State rela-
tionship nor the State-society relationship disappear when a contract is
made because liberal democratic theory says they cannot.60 On the
contrary, these relationships persist and influence the State's newly
assumed obligations.
This means that, like any other public body, the State "possesses
powers solely in order that it may use them for the public good. '61 It means
that the State has nothing to win or lose by entering into a contract
because:
60. The Court in Skywest acknowledges that even in a contractual setting, the State remains
a lawmaker. See supra, note 39 at 46.
61. H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, 6th ed, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) at 400.
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it represents, not its own interest (indeed, it is difficult to envisage how the
administration, as such, can have any interests of its own), but the interests
of the public, of society in general.62
The State's obligations are not contained in the contract alone because
it continues to owe duties of governance to society at large and to the
private party who, obviously enough, continues to be an individual
citizen. The State is not simply bound to a contract; it must fulfil
simultaneously its duties within these pre-existing relationships as well.
Liberal democratic theory limits what the State can do in the marketplace,
how it can do it, and for what reasons.
Similar limits are not placed on participants in private contractual
arrangements. There, the liberal ideal of freedom has a wider scope; the
terms and conditions of the contract more fully circumscribe obligation;
the individual has fewer positive obligations. As Hugh Collins summa-
rizes it,
A ... conventional classification of the law of contract, which has domi-
nated legal discourse during the last century, views the purpose of contract
law as the creation of a facility for individuals to pursue their voluntary
choices. Its latent social ideal embodies a liberal state in which the law
maximizes the liberty of individual citizens, [and] encourages self-reli-
ance ... It secures these goals by facilitating the creation of legal obliga-
tions on any terms which individuals freely choose. This familiar textbook
picture unites the law of contract by deriving its principal doctrines from
the concept of voluntary choice. 63
Notwithstanding the clear differences between individual and State,
the State's ongoing liberal democratic obligations in the contractual
arena are often forgotten. First, because the private law model does not
generally give legal significance to extra-contractual relationships, State
obligations are referenced only with respect to the contract in question.
Second - absent bad faith on the part of a State official64 - the State's
liberal democratic duty to act in the public good and treat the individual
with respect is largely unenforceable. In sum, because it is not clear when
62. A. Mewett, "The Theory of Government Contracts" (1959), 5 McGill Law Journal 222 at
223, in reference to French public contracts.
63. Supra, note 16 at 1. There are, of course, common law principles which ameliorate some
of the harshness which can come from this model. Further, its descriptive accuracy has been
challenged by scholars such as Collins and Ian Macneil. See, in particular, Macneil's The New
Social Contract:AnEnquiry intoModern ContractualRelations (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1980). Nonetheless, the liberal ideal of voluntary choice remains at the centre of neo-
classical contract law.
64. According to Arrowsmith, supra, note 3 at 182, State officials must act within the doctrine
of good faith and so are "prohibited from acting out ofpersonal motives." The official must also
respect the rule against self-dealing - it must not gleal in its official capacity with itself in its
personal capacity, at 186. If either the doctrine or the rule are disregarded, the contract is
voidable at the instance of the Government, at 186.
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the State's contractual conduct will be subject to judicial review, and even'
whether it is bound by fiduciary principles,65 the larger social and political
context of the State contract is ignored.
The fact that many of the State's liberal democratic duties may be
unenforceable or of uncertain legal stature does not make them less
solemn or politically mandatory. Nor does it mean that the individual and
State are therefore equally free in the marketplace. The private law model
largely disregards individual-State differences only because it does not
have the categories to contemplate them in the first place. Its conclusion
that the State and individual share the same freedom of contractis tenuous
at best and cannot produce a liberal democratic pedigree.
b. Common law principles
We have already seen that the State has a duty to contract in the interests
of the public good and continues to owe the individual contracting party
certain liberal democratic obligations. We have also seen that the State
remains itself - even in a commercial contract - and so has unique
coercive resources. Notwithstanding the private law model's inability to
accommodate the dual fact of State power and obligation, there are
common law principles, albeit limited, which expressly override the
model and restrict what kind of contract the State can enter.
In accepting that the State and individual are not analogical, and that
legal consequences flow from differences, these principles contradict the
private law model in the name of liberal democratic values. They testify
against the model's descriptive accuracy and usefulness. Unfortunately,
as I will show, because the principles are seen to co-exist with the model
as mere exceptions, their application is not generally clear, their scope is
sometimes tentative, and their significance is always undervalued.
i. The exercise of governmental power must be consistent with the
Canadian constitution
The State's exercise of its executive powers, whether derived from
"statute, common law or prerogative, must be adapted to conform with
65. See Arrowsmith's discussion, ibid. at 189-190. In Arrowsmith's view, there should be an
express public law of fiduciary obligations, at 189-190, because it would impose a greater range
of substantive obligations and remedies. For example, where a public contract is awarded on
the basis of a bribe, it constitutes "a breach of the public law doctrine of good faith" and so can
be set aside. But, according to Arrowsmith, at 184, the
fiduciary obligation ... goes further - it forbids a party from accepting a bribe, not
merely from acting on it. Thus, a party relying on this doctrine need not show that any
award was induced by the bribe, but only that the bribe was made.
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constitutional imperatives. ' 66 Even decisions made by cabinet, however
political, "are all subject to judicial scrutiny for compatibility with the
Constitution ' 67 because they constitute a matter within the authority of
Parliament or the legislature, pursuant to section 32(1) of the Charter.6
As Mr. Justice Dickson states: "I have no doubt that the executive branch
of the Canadian government is duty bound to act in accordance with the
dictates of the Charter."69
That Charter constraints apply to the State contract is confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Douglas College v. Douglasl
Kwantlen Faculty Association. ° In that case, the Supreme Court of
Canada determined that first, the actions of a Crown agency (here a
community college) in negotiating and administering a collective agree-
ment constituted an action of government for the purposes of section 32
of the Charter;7' second, that the collective agreement was "law" within
the meaning of the section 15 equality provision of the Charter,72 and
66. Air Canada v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1987] 1 W.W.R. 304 at 309.
(S.C.C.).
In this case, Air Canada had issued a petition of right to bring an action for a governmental
accounting based on the alleged unconstitutionality of a taxation statute. On the advice of the
Attorney-General, the Lieutenant-Governor denied to grant his fiat. Justice La Forest, for the
Supreme Court of Canada, found that the exercise of the Lieutenant-Governor's discretion here
was reviewable: "In my view, if even a statute cannot permit the retention of moneys obtained
under an unconstitutional statute, that result cannot be achieved under a purported exercise of
a discretion to refuse a fiat, whatever may be the legal foundation of the supposed discretion,"
at 309.
See too Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986]
2 S.C.R. 573, hereafter Dolphin Delivery.
67. Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 455. At issue here was a
federal cabinet decision to allow the testing of American cruise missiles over Canadian
territory. The appellants alleged that such a decision was contrary to section 7 of the Charter
as being contrary to security of the person, at 448.
68. Ibid. at 455 and 463464.
Section 32(1) of the Charter provided:
This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the
authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and
Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the Legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within
the authority of the legislature of each province.
69. Ibid at 455.
70. Douglas College v.DouglaslKwantlen Faculty Association, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570. For the
text of section 32, see note 68.
71. Ibid.
72. The majority found the agreement to be "law" because it involved a mandatory policy,
ibid. at 585. Even working with this minimum standard, a State contract would be "law" as it
too reflects government policy with respect to what goods and services are needed and on what
basis.
Section 15(1) of the Charter provides:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
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third, to the extent that the impugned contract violated Charter rights, it
would be unenforceable: "To permit government to pursue policies
violating Charter rights by means of contracts and agreements with other
persons or bodies cannot be tolerated."73
Such a constraint on the State's freedom of contract is mandatory from
the perspective of liberal democratic theory. Clearly, the State must
respect Canada's "supreme law;" it could not be at liberty to ignore the
idea of the Canadian State, to violate the rights and freedoms of its
citizenry, and to disregard through its own contractual conduct the
requirements of justice in the community.
By way of contrast, contracts between individuals are not subject to
provisions of the Charter - though provincial human rights legislation
may impose limitations - because no governmental action is involved. It
is assumed that in the private sphere, individuals can take care of
themselves and are more free to be bound to the terms they please.
Further, as the British Columbia Court of Appeal expresses it, one ought
to reject the Charter's application to private arrangements because:
It is a rare commercial contract which does not exfacie infringe on some
freedom set out in section 2 or some legal right under section 7 [of the
Charter.] To include such private commercial contracts under scrutiny of
the Charter could create havoc in the commercial life of the country.74
73. Ibid.
It should be noted that the Court contemplated the possibility of an individual being competent
to bargain away some of his or her rights - such as the right not to be discriminated against on
the basis of age- if that bargaining away is rational, at 585. The Court said it would be unlikely
to find as rational bargaining away the right not to be discriminated on the basis of race,
however.
Note too Justice Sopinka's dissent on this point in Douglas College, supra note 70 at
616:
Both La Forest and Wilson JJ. are of the view that the mandatory retirement provisions
in the collective agreement qualify as "law" under s. 15 of the Charter notwithstanding
that such "policies" may be the product of fair negotiations reflecting the desired
objectives of both parties. I respectfully disagree that the consensual nature of the
policies in question may be so discarded in the examination as to whether they constitute
"law." In this regard, I share the misgivings of my colleague Justice Cory, as expressed
in McKinney, with the proposition that an individual cannot, under any circumstances
contract out of the rights of equality in matters pertaining to age.
74. See Re Bhindi (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 47 at 54 (B.C.C.A.), referred to with approval in
McKinney v. University of Guelph, supra note 30 at 262 where the Court held that the Charter
is not applicable to a private contract.
Note that in Re Bhindi, the trial judge expressly rejected the argument that the Charter would
apply to all contracts as the State has a presence in all aspects of society. SeeRe Bhindi (1985),
20 D.L.R. 391 (Q.B.). See too Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 66.
Public Power and Private Obligation: An Analysis of the Government Contract 501
ii. The exercise of government power must be consistent with the State's
statutory powers and duties
The State cannot fetter by contract its statutory power to enact, amend, or
repeal legislation.75 Its legislative powers are to be exercised for the
public interest alone76 and not in furtherance of a contractual obligation.
Similarly, the public interest requires that neither the government nor a
public authority contractually disable itself from performing a statutory
duty or from exercising a discretionary power conferred by or under a
statute.77 A contract which is incompatible with the government's legis-
lative obligations and "statutory birthright '78 fails even if the matter is
largely commercial. This is because it is difficult to distinguish between
the State's discretionary power which is to be used in the public good and
the State's executive power to enter into commercial contracts.79
The private law strategy of recasting as exceptional a-dominant and
subsisting aspect of the State's identity - namely its legislative and
statutory powers and obligations - produces a perplexing result. In order
to make the State fit the private law model, it is said that the State is like
the individual in a contractual setting. Yet should the State act like an
individual and not concern itself with its unique legislative and discre-
tionary duties, the model reminds the State of its true identity,80 holds it
to that standard, and cuts back on the freedom of contract it originally
seemed to have. This convolution makes one question yet again the
model's analogical starting point and the coextensive freedom of contract
which it presumes between State and individual.
iii. The principles of review
Individuals bargaining in the marketplace owe each other a minimum
regard because liberalismassumes that each person will look to his or her
own interests; further, it seeks to be neutral concerning how people ought
75. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, [1977] 139
C.L.R.54 at 71 (H.C.Aus.): The King v. Dominion Stamp of Canada, [1930] S.C.R.500;
Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway Company v. A.G. of B.C, [1949] 2 W.W.R. 1233 (P.C., on
appeal from the S.C.C.).
76. Ansett, ibid at 71. See too Wade, supra, note 61 at 377.
77. Ansett, ibid at 74.
There is, in addition, some very limited authority for the proposition that the State is not
competent to fetter the exercise of its future executory power by contract. I discuss this doctrine
in Part V and take the position that it does not state the law.
78. Kell-Erny's Enterprises v. Dyck (1987), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 456 at 461 (B.C.C.A.).
79. Ansett, supra, note 75.
80. See Ansett, ibid and other cases cited in footnote 75. See too Kell-Erny's Enterprises,
supra, note 78.
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and ought not to interact.8' Of course, the law enforces limits so that
contracts retain the level of voluntariness and fairness required to be
contracts properly so called. The law does not tolerate, for example,
fraud, misrepresentation extortion, duress or unconscionable behav-
iour.82 Nor is the State allowed to bargain in such unacceptable ways. But
in addition, the State is subject to unique judicial scrutiny because it is the
State. Though the grounds for and scope of judicial review remain
unclear, to the extent that the State's contractual conduct is justiciable
where the individual's conduct is not, their respective freedom of contract
does not coincide. Put another way, if the State's conduct is specifically
regulated in the contractual arena, it is not empowered to enter any
arrangement it pleases. It can only strike an agreement which is the
product of an approved kind of bargaining.
Beyond the requirement for constitutionality discussed earlier, there is
no general proposition concerning judicial review of the State contract.
We do know, however, that- unlike the individual- the State owes a duty
of fairness in the certain contractual situations. In 1990, for example, the
Court in Thomas Assaly83 asserted that governmental decisions concern-
ing the acceptance or rejection of tenders:
directly affect the interests of persons invited to bid ... There is therefore
attached a duty of fairness which Courts can enforce by certiorari, [see eg.
Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602
at 628] a public law remedy to control the proper exercise of governmental
powers.'4
A similar determination to ensure fairness in the awarding of governmen-
tal contracts is at work in The Glenview Corp v. Canada (Min. of Public
Works)85:
The Court must be vigilant in assuring itself that the Crown is acting in
utmost good faith and not actually attempting to obviate the tendering
process.8 6
81. Collins, supra, note 16 at 1.
82. See Treitel, supra, note 23, Chs. 9, 10, 11, and 12.
83. Thomas C. Assaly Corp. v. Canada (1990), 34 F.T.R. 156 (T.D.).
84. Ibid., at 158. In this particular case, fairness required that "the party whose interests are to
be affected by a decision be aware of the issues he must address to have achance of succeeding,"
at 159.
85. (1990), 34 F.T.R. 292 (T.D.).
86. Ibid., at 296. Note that there is recent obiter commentary in favour of the proposition that
the Government does not owe a duty of fairness when involved in a purely commercial contract
which does not affect the public interest. See St. Lawrence Cement v. Ontario (Minister of
Transportation) (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 30 (Ont.Ct.G.D.) which involved a tender call for the
reconstruction of apublic highway. Given the Supreme Court of Canada's decision inDywidag
Systems which implicitly determined that a contract for the construction of a wharf in Nova
Scotia was not a purely commercial matter, the reasoning in St. Lawrence Cement is suspect.
See my discussion of Dywidag, supra, footnote 57.
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But in both Thomas Assaly and Glenview, the Courts confine them-
selves to the tendering context. We still have no judicial pronouncement
on whether the executive owes a duty of fairness in all its contractual
dealings, whether established by tender or not." We still have no
Canadian position on whether the question of review is also dependent on
the contractual power being exercised statutorily as opposed to being an
incident of the State's common law powers.88 We still do not know the
extent to which administrative law principles of-justice are relevant to the
State contract.
For now, it is enough to note that an important public law standard has
been adopted into the private law regime of State contracts. Assaly and
Glenview may mark the beginnings of a trend whereby the judiciary seeks
to ensure that governmental decisions are made on the basis of fair
87. What is ironic about the absence of a clear judicial position is that opportunities to state
the law have presented themselves but not been seized by the Courts. In Quasar Helicopters
Ltd. v. The Queen, [1983] I F.C. 536 (T.D.), for example, the plaintiff brought action against
the Government for failing to consider atender which-unknown to the Government at the time
despite its best efforts - in fact, had met all statutory and regulatory prerequisites to
consideration. The plaintiff argued that the Government owed it a duty of fairness - here to
consider tenders which meet the requisite preconditions - and breached that duty in failing to
do so. Instead of providing some guidance on this point, the Court seized upon the fact that the
Government had attempted to be scrupulously fair in determining whether the plaintiff's tender
was eligible but the procedure proved unavoidably fallible. On this basis, the Court asserted,
at 563:
The procedure was fair and was followed. Accordingly there was no breach of the duty
of fairness by the Minister and his servants, assuming there was such duty which counsel
for the defendant contended did not exist and which I do not decide.
Note that, because the Government in Quasar had not been negligent, the respondents could
not even rely on the case of Walter Cabott Construction Ltd. v. The Queen (1974), 44 D.L.R.
(3rd) 82 at 98 (F.C.T.D.) which held that "the relationship between the person who invites
tenders on a building contract and those who accept that invitation is such a particular
relationship as to impose a duty of care upon that person...."
88. To the extent that a contract is based on a statutory or delegated statutory power, one could
argue that a duty of fairness is also owed. This is because administrative law already recognizes
the public interest in the proper exercise of all statutory and statutorily delegated power. See
Board of Education of Indian Head School Division v. Knight,[1990] 3 W.W.R. 289 at 306
(S.C.C.).
It is not always clear however, whether an executive contract is the product of the State's
common law power to contract or if the authority is statutory. See Arrowsmith's recitation of
case law in support of the both propositions, supra, note 3 at 138-143. Accordingly, the scope
of review in Canada is still not known.
It is worth noting that the confusion outlined above could be avoided if Canadian Courts would
adopt the reasoning of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
CivilService, [1985] A.C. 374 (hereafter C.C.S.U.) There, at 410, the Court takes the position
that the availability of judicial review should not turn on whether the impugned act has a
statutory or common law source:
I see no reason why simply because a decision-making power is derived from a common
law and not a statutory source, it shouldfor that reason alone be immune from judicial
review.
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procedure. This, in turn, reduces the competence of the private model to
account for the law of State contracts and to provide direction for the
future.
Related evidence of a judicial movement towards reducing the State's
freedom of contract is found in the relatively new doctrine of legitimate
expectation. 9 Under its English rubric, the doctrine provides that all
executive conduct 0 is subject to judicial review on the grounds of
"illegality," "irrationality" and "procedural impropriety." What follows
is Lord Diplock's account of these grounds:
By "illegality" as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-
maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-
making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par
excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by
those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is
exercisable.
By "irrationality" I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as
"Wednesbury unreasonableness".... It applies to a decision which is so
outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided
could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a
question that judges by their training and experience should be well
equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with
our judicial system....
I have described the third head as "procedural impropriety" rather than
failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with
procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the
decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head
covers also failure by an administrative tribunal [should one be involved]
to observe procedural rules ... even where such failure does not involve
any denial of natural justice.9'
Lord Diplock's statement of the law goes beyond the traditional
principles of administrative review in two ways. First, it renders justici-
89. For discussion by English courts of the doctrine of legitimate expectation see Schmidt v.
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1969] 1 All E.R. 904 at 909 (C.A.); Attorney General
Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, [1983] 2 A.C. 629 at 636 and 638; O'Reilly v. Mackman, [1983]
2 A.C. 237; Reg. v. Liverpool Corporations, Ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators'
Association, [1972] 2 Q.B, 299; and C.C.S.U., supra note 88.
90. That legitimate expectation applies to executive action is underscored by Lord Roskill who
asserts in C.C.S.U., supra, note 88 at 417:
If the executive in pursuance of the statutory power does an act affecting the rights of
the citizen, it is beyond question that in principle the manner of the exercise of that
power may today be challenged.
91. Ibid., at 4JO-411.
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able the State's contractual conduct92 when the individual's interests are
materially affected.93 Second, by requiring procedural propriety, the
doctrine can demand more than simple fairness. It can require that the
State be fair in very specific ways. For example, if a citizen reasonably
assumes that a given procedure will be employed by the State in order to
make its determination, the doctrine of legitimate expectation requires
the State to comply with that reasonable assumption. As the Court
provided in Ng Yuen Shiu:
when a public authority has promised to follow a certain procedure, it is
in the interests of good administration that it should act fairly and should
implement its promise, so long as implementation does not interfere with
its statutory duty.94
Similarly, if the citizen has a legitimate expectation that he or she will
receive a benefit from the State based on well established practice, "the
courts will protect his expectation by judicial review as a matter of public
law," even if the person "has no legal right" to the benefit as a matter of
private law.95 And while the judicial enquiry is never one which goes to
the merits,96 the objective is for the Court to review the impugned
proceedings "so as to ensure, as far as may be, that justice is done."97
The doctrine of legitimate expectation has recently been considered by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Old St. Boniface Residents Association
Inc. v. The City of Winnipeg and the St. Boniface-St. Vital Community
Committeef5 In that case, the Court referred to the doctrine in light of a
dispute regarding rezoning by the City of Winnipeg. The appellants
alleged, inter alia, that the City planning committee assured them of an
opportunity for consultation prior to development. But, despite their
"legitimate expectation," no such consultation occurred.Y Mr. Justice
'92. C.C.S.U., ibid, involved a Minister unilaterally altering a term of employment pursuant to
a Service Code and Order-in-Council entitling her to do just that. The Court found, however,
that the Minister's employees - due to a long standing practice of consultation within the
Department- would normally have had the right to be consulted on the Government's decision
to change a significant condition of their employment, at 412-413. However, the Government
successfully argued against the duty to consult given the interests of national security, at 413.
93. Accordingly to Lord Diplock, ibid., at 408-409, the individual can invoke the doctrine of
legitimate expectation when the government, or other public body, alters an individual's
legally enforceable rights or obligations, or alternatively, withholds from the individual a
benefit contrary to past dealings or express assurances.
94. Ng Yuen Shiu, supra, note 89 at 638.
95. C.C.S.U., supra, note 88 at 401 per Lord Fraser of Tully Belton.
96. As the Court in C.C.S.U. states, ibid at 401, quoting Chief Constable of the North Wales
Police v. Evans, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1155 at 1173: "Judicial review is concerned, not with the
decision, but with the decision-making process."
97. Per Lord Denning in Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Exparte Hosenball, [1977] 1
W.L.R. 766, quoted with approval in C.C.S.U., ibid at 400.
98. (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.)
99. See judgment of Sopinka J., ibid., at 413-414.
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Sopinka summarized the case law regarding the doctrine of legitimate
expectation in the following terms:
The principle developed in these cases [including C.C.S.U. and Ng Yuen
Shiu] is simply an extension of the rules of natural justice and procedural
fairness. It affords a party affected by the decision of a public official an
opportunity to make representations in circumstances in which there
otherwise would be no such opportunity. The court supplies the omission
where, based on the conduct of the public official, a party has been led to
believe that his or her rights would not be affected without consultation.'1°
Unfortunately, His Lordship expressed no opinion on the general
application of the doctrine in Canada. He simply determined that the
planning and zoning process itself provided the appellants with an
adequate opportunity to be heard:
Even if the conduct of this [planning] committee raised expectations on the
part of the appellant, I am of the opinion that this would not justify this
Court in mounting onto the elaborate statutory scheme yet another process
of consultation. 0'
In Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan,102 the Supreme Court of
Canada had occasion to consider the doctrine of legitimate expectation
in greater detail. Here, Mr. Justice Sopinka clearly affirmed the doctrines'
existence in Canada and underscored several important provisos restrict-
ing it applicability. First, he noted that the doctrine cannot be invoked to
create substantive rights.0 3 Second, he emphasized that the doctrine
cannot be invoked to prohibit government from introducing legislation in
Parliament or the legislatures because such a prohibition would be
contrary to the requirements of a democracy." 4 In this regard, Mr. Justice
Sopinka quoted with approval the following passage from West Lakes
Ltd. v. South Australia, a decision of the Supreme Court of Australia
which concerned contractual obligations:
Ministers of State cannot, however, by means of contractual obligations
entered into on behalf of the State fetter their own freedom, or the freedom
of their successors or the freedom of other members of parliament to
propose, consider and, if they think fit, vote for laws, even laws which are
inconsistent with the contractual obligations. 05
Rather, the doctrine of legitimate expectations is relatively circum-
scribed:
It is a part of the rules of procedural fairness which can govern adminis-
trative bodies. Where it is applicable, it can create a right to make
100. Ibid., at 414.
101. Ibid.
102. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525
103. Ibid. at 557.
104. Ibid. at 559.
105. (1980),25 S.A.S.R. 389 at 390, quoted with approval in Reference re Canada Assistance
Plan, ibid. at 560.
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representations or to be consulted. It does not fetter the decision following
the representations or consultation.l°6
Even prior to these two very recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada, the doctrine of legitimate expectation had received a largely
favourable reception from the lower courts. It has been applied in its
English form by the Federal Court of Appeal,107 British Columbia Court
of Appeal,108 the Ontario High Court of Justice,109 as well as being referred.
to with approval in numerous other instances.110 Only in Alberta had the
doctrine been rejected for being based on a distinction which did not
"reflect a principle that can withstand scrutiny in the light of the object of
judicial review by certiorari."' '
It is apparent that the kind of review favoured by the Courts in Assaly
and in Glenview, as well as by those which recognize the doctrine of
legitimate expectation, originates in administrative law and is intended to
protect the individual from the improper exercise of State power.112 This
is always a legitimate judicial concern in a liberal democratic society. In
order to preserve the reciprocity between governor and governed, to
enforce State duties of governance, and to reduce individual vulnerabil-
ity, theprinciple ofjudicialreview constrains- albeit on an unsystematized
and incomplete basis - the State's freedom of contract. The beginnings
of judicial review- whether derived from administrative or constitutional
grounds - require the governor to treat the individual fairly' 3 in spite of
the private law model and the individual-State analogue.
106. Reference re Canada Assistance Plan, ibid. at 557-558.
107. Bendahmane v. Minister of Employment (1989), 95 N.R. 385 at 392-393 (F.C.A.).
108. Reference re Canada Assistance Plan, reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, supra
note 102.
109. Ontario Nursing Home Association et al. v. The Queen in Right of Ontario (1990), 72
D.L.R. (4th) 166 (H.C.J.). Here, in recognizing the doctrine, the Court also recognized that it
cannot "impose a positive obligation on government to grant substantive rights," at 180.
110. For the more recent examples, see St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. The Queen in Right of
Ontario, supra, note 86; Rainbow v. Central Okanagan School District No. 23, [1990] B.C.J.
No. 2057 (C.A.); Central Kootenay (Regional District) v. Canada (Minister of Transport)
(1990), 39 F.T.R. 60 (T.D.);Hamilton-Wentworth (RegionalMunicipality) (1991),2 O.R. (3d)
716 (Div. Ct.); Piche v. Canada (1989), 98 N.R. 148 (F.C.A.); and Pacific Fishermen's
Defence Alliance of Canada v. Canada (1987), 84 N.R. 387 (F.C.A.).
111. Hudfeld v. Board of Fort Sask. General Hospital District No. 98 (1986), 49 Alta. L.R.
(2d) 256 at 267 (Q.B.), affd (1988), 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 165 (C.A.).
112. Wade defines the primary purpose of administrative law as to "keep the powers of
government within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citizens against their abuse. The
power engines of authority must be prevented from running amok." See supra, note 61 at 5.
113. An individual's legitimate expectation regarding what another individual ought to do has,
in general, no legal consequences and affords no private law remedy. See O'Reilly, supra, note
89 at 275.
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2. Equality of Bargaining
There are, as I discussed earlier, two features of the State which make it
unbridgeably different from the individual - its duties of governance and
coercive resources. We have seen that the presumption of a coextensive
freedom of contract between individual and State is fallacious because it
submerges these differences. The private law's presumption of equality
of bargaining is also fallacious and uses a similar submerging technique.
The model concludes that the individual and State are contractual equals
because it recognizes only exaggerated forms of inequality such as
incapacity, duress and unconscionability." 4 It concludes that equality is
present based on an unrealistically restrictive notion of what would count
as inequality.
To demonstrate my contention that there is a basic and formal inequal-
ity between individual and State, I will explore three ways in which State
power in the contractual arena undermines the private law's assumption
of equality. They are: Crown prerogatives; State control over its internal
organization; and State control over contractual terms.' 5 To the extent
that these factors give the State advantages in the bargaining for and
enforceability of its contracts is the extent to which, yet again, the
descriptive accuracy of the private law model is impugned.
a. Crown prerogatives
Crown prerogatives are an historical incident of sovereignty and so
constitute a unique category of privilege. According to Blackstone:
By the word prerogative we usually understand that special pre-eminence,
which the king hath over and above all other persons, and out of the
ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity. It
signifies, in its etymology, (from prae and rogo), something that is required
or demanded before, or in preference to all others. And hence it follows,
that it must be in its nature singular and eccentrical; that it can only be
applied to those rights and capacities which the kind enjoys alone, and in
contradistinction to others, and not to those which he enjoys in common
with any of his subjects.' 1 6
114. See Treitel's account of these forms of inequality in supra, note 23.
115. It should be noted that prohibitions, discussed in the previous section, against the State
entering into contracts which are contrary to the Canadian Constitution or which fetter the
State's statutory powers and duties demonstrate an inequality between individual and State, but
one operating in the opposite direction.
116. Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 1 (Chitty ed. 1826) at 238-239.
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Because prerogative powers give immunity to the State from certain
common law liabilities and duties, they refute the analogical premise of
the private law model by enforcing legal distinction. There are complex
prerogative rules' 17 covering a wide array of subject matter including: the
bindingness of statutes on the State; the employment of Crown servants;
the availability of judicial remedies against the State such as injunction,
specific performance, distress, garnishment and attachment; State liabil-
ity for interest; as well as its susceptibility to the doctrines of estoppel,
waiver and laches."l8 Due to the scope of the project, I do not propose to
engage in a thorough review of the law of prerogatives in order to
establish my point that the individual is not the State's contractual equal.
Instead, I will discuss the State's immunity from the doctrine of estoppel,
since this has a very direct impact on State's contractual obligations.
Sherwin Lyman identifies estoppel" 9 as a Crown prerogative which
reaches back at least as far as the early seventeenth century. 20 He notes
that in 1613, the English Courts held the Crown not to be bound by
fictions of law' 21 and in 1623, determined that the Crown was not bound
by a fiction of law known as estoppel.122 The entire matter is summarized
in Everest & Strode's Law of Estoppel,
it appears from the authorities that the King is not bound by estoppels,
though he can take advantage of them. Thus, it is laid down in Viner's
Abridgement that the King is not bound by estoppels and that the king is
not estopped by his patent."n
117. As Holdsworth has asserted, with respect to Crown prerogatives, inA History of English
Law:
This miscellaneous collection of rights and privileges, which make up the incidental
prerogatives of the Crown, come ... from many different periods in English legal
history, and are based on many different ideas. ... All of these diverse ideas have, from
an early date, become the starting-points for the continuous development of bodies of
very technical rules, some of which are wholly or partially obsolete, while others have
survived and function in an environment to which they are ill-suited.
Quoted with approval by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v.
Code (1988), 84 A.R. 241 at 246, per Kerans J.A.
118. See, for example, Hogg's account of the Crown prerogatives and immunities, supra, note
21.
119. There is no definitive account ofestoppel by conduct by Lord Denning's attempt is useful:
Estoppel is not a rule of evidence. It is not a cause of actioi. It is a principle of justice
and of equity. It comes to this. When a man, by his words or conduct, had led another
to believe in a particular state of affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when it
would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so.
See Moorgate Mercantile v. Twitchings, [1975] 3 All E.R. 314 at 323 (C.A.).
120. S. Lyman, "Estoppel and the Crown" (1978), 9 Manitoba Law Review 15 at 15-16.
121. Sheffield and Ratcliff (1613), Jenk. 287; 145 E.R. 207 (Ex. Div.), referred to by Lyman,
ibid. at 16.
122. Sir Edward Coke's Case (1623), Godbolt 289 at 299, referred to by Lyman, ibid.
123. (1907) at 8, quoted by Lyman, ibid.
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But though the origin of the prerogative is clear, its modem day scope
is contested and polemically so. On the one hand, Lyman writes:
"Estoppel is, in Canada, ineffective against the Crown." 24 Hogg, on the
other hand, contends: "The Crown is bound by the law of estoppel."'"
And there is numerous case law cited by both writers in favour of their
respective positions. 126
But even if it were possible, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
resolve the debate between Lyman and Hogg. 127 Instead, I propose to
explore an incontestable strand of the Crown's immunity from estoppel
and one which has a significant impact on the State contract. That strand
has been succinctly summarized in the following' terms:
where a particular obligation or duty is imposed by statute or by
regulations validly made thereunder and embodied in a contract no
estoppel should be allowed to give relief from the said obligation. 121
This Crown immunity constitutes an important example of inequality
between individual and State in the contractual arena. It means that in
every statutory contract, estoppel cannot lie against the State. Indeed,
because the terms and conditions of a statutory contract are legislative, 29
any State representation which does not align is contrary to law and so
unenforceable.
124. Ibid at 15.
125. Hogg, supra, note 21 at 189.
126. See Lyman's entire article, supra, note 120 and see Hogg, ibid at 189-191, including
notes.
127. Part of the difficulty in resolving uncertainty regarding the scope of the Crown's
immunity relates to the numerous circumstances in which the immunity might be invoked and
a failure to distinguish amongst them. What is required is an analysis of the types of situations
in which the State invokes its immunity from estoppel and the judicial outcome. Lyman
provides an effective beginning to this project, supra, note 120.
128. Millet v. The Queen, [1954] Ex.C.R. 562 at 572. See too St. Ann's Island Shooting and
Fishing Club Ltd. v. The King, [1950] S.C.R. 211 at 220 which provides that "There can be no
estoppel in the face of an express provision of a statute." See too case law cited in favour of this
proposition in P. Lordon, Crown Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at 321. My research has
found no case which contradicts this particular statement of law.
129. See Attorney General of Newfozndland v. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation
Limited (1983), 49 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181 at 211 (Nfld. S.C.); aff'd on other grounds in (1985),
56 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91 (Nfld. C.A.); aff'd on both grounds in [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1085. See also
Millet, supra note 128 at 570.
It is, of course, true that if the individual were to make representations to the State which
contradicted the terms of a statutory contract, estoppel would not lie against the individual. One
could therefore argue that the Crowns immunity from estoppel within this context is no
different than that enjoyed by the individual. There are two points to be made in opposition
to this argument. First, the statutory contract - reflecting the Crown's superior bargaining
position - is largely comprised of terms which give the State specific rights, powers, and
privileges. There are few terms in favour of the individual. Second, even on those occasions
where an individual has waived a privilege and successfully resisted the doctrine of estoppel
due to the statutory nature of the contract, the State remains competent to amend by legislation
the statutory contract in question and so make it accord with the terms of the individual's
representation. In these two fundamental ways, therefore, the individual's "immunity" from
estoppel is largely theoretical and practically weak.
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Statutory contracts are by no means unusual. They dominant in all
industries involving the exploitation of State-owned natural resources
and are made in thecontextof State-run insurance andpension schemes. 30
In these kinds of contracts at least, the private law model is significantly
displaced because different rules of reliance and liability apply.
An illustration of the State's prerogative is found in a 1983 decision of
the Newfoundland Trial Division. In Churchill Falls,' the Government
of Newfoundland (hereafter "the government") statutorily leased to the
defendant (hereafter "CFLCo") the right to exploit and sell Churchill
Falls produced energy. Clause 2(e) of the lease provided that "upon the
request of the Government[,] consumers of electricity in the province
shall be given priority where it is feasible and economic to do so. '1132 On
the basis of express representations from the government that what it
required pursuant to clause 2(e) would be 300MW of electricity, CFLCo
contracted to sell to Quebec Hydro all the remaining energy it produced,
beyond that 300MW. Subsequently faced with increased energy needs,
the government by Order-in-Council demanded 800MW. When CFLCo
refused to comply because of its contractual commitment to Hydro
Quebec, the Government sought a declaration of entitlement from the
Court.
One of the defences which CFLCo raised was estoppel and it did so
with very good reason. As the Court points out:
There were discussions between the Government and CFLCo in which the
Government held out that a recapture provision of 300 MW would be
satisfactory to it. CFLCo relied on this and held out to Hydro Quebec that
that was the position of Government. Hydro Quebec relied on this....
It has all the earmarks of estoppel. The Government held out a certain
position and CFLCo relied upon this position and acted upon it.'33
Hence, but for any prerogative immunity, the representations would have
been binding.T 34
However, as the lease was statutory, the Court found that clause 2(e)
represented the will of the House and could not be altered by the
representations of a government official:
The Lease by itself is a contract between the Government and CFLCo. It
is something more, however. It is part of an act of the House of Assembly.
... It has legislative sanction. The law of the land is that the Newfoundland
consumer, upon the request of the Lieutenant-Governor, be given priority.
130. See Millet, ibid.
131. Supra, note 129.
132. Ibid., at 194.
133. Ibid., at 240.
134. Ibid., at 241.
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No person, however highly placed, may deny that right to the Crown, or
limit it. Only the House of Assembly may do that.'35
Accordingly, and leaving open the possibility that estoppel might be
available against the Crown in certain circumstances, the Court found
that estoppel would not lie.136
In disposing of the case, the Court did determine that the government
was not entitled to all the energy it was seeking. Due to the Court's
interpretation of clause 2(e), the government was entitled only to recap-
ture energy which was surplus to CFLCo's contractual obligations. 37 On
appeal, the matter of estoppel was not discussed by the Court. 31 On
further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the approaches
taken by both lower levels without further comment. 39
Churchill Falls is not the first example of a person seeking unsuccess-
fully to rely on official representations within the context of a statutory
contract. In the earlier decision of Millet v. The Queen, 40 at issue was a
contract made pursuant to the Veterans Insurance Act. 4' The plaintiff
sought to claim on a life insurance policy which the government had
purported to cancel for nonpayment of premiums. While, in fact, the last
two premiums were overdue, the plaintiff sought to raise estoppel against
the State on the basis that previous late payments had been accepted by
government officials without cancellation. 42 The judge found, however,
that estoppel could not lie:
The Veterans Insurance Act and its regulations ... is the law of the land
applicable to this contract of insurance. The contention that these regula-
tions [governing when payments are due] did not bind the parties or have
the force of law is not based on any sound reason. 143
The plaintiff's petition of right was accordingly dismissed." 4
From a liberal democratic perspective, aspects of the State's immunity
from estoppel can clearly be defended. The immunity is intended to
protect the public good 45 and ensure that the State officials are held to the
135. Ibid., at 243.
136. Ibid., at 242-243.
137. Ibid., at 313.
138. Churchill Falls Corporation Limited (C.A.), supra, note 129.
139. Ibid (S.C.C.).
140. Supra, note 128.
141. S.C. 1944-45, 8 Geo. VI, c. 49.
142. Supra, note 128 at 570.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid, at 572.
145. Laker Airways v. Dept. of Trade, [1977] 2 All E.R. 182 at 194.
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Rule of Law. 146 Yet, even as these interests are elevated, the integrity of
the State is subject to compromise because what is tolerated is the making
of official representations without legal consequences. A necessary
corollary is that the individual who has relied on the State is without
remedy, not even in restitution. This is problematic from the perspective
of fairness generally and individual rights specifically.
Further, the State's residual power to contradict itself 47 in legally
unchallengeable ways belies the analogical premise of the private law
model. The individual and the State do not share equivalent legal
resources but this escapes the attention of a model which is only alert to
inequality evidenced by duress, incapacity, or undue influence. The
conclusion of equality is merely the restatement of its own premise.
b. The State's internal organization
The State's unusual control over the nature of its contractual obligations
finds another source in the power emanating from the Government's
internal organization. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada as-
serts:
For the purposes of allegedly internal organization and operation, the
Administration uses instructions, guidelines, manuals, directives and
other similar practices which enable it to alter substantially the state of the
law in many cases. 141
While the Commission does not give examples of this phenomenon, they
are not difficult to find. Take, for instance the Federal Government's
Treasury Board Manual, clause .4.2.2: "Conviction under Section 121,
124 and 418 of the Criminal Code149 denies the capacity to contract with
the Crown." Or consider the policy requirement providing that when the
Government is contracting for goods and services worth $200,000 or
more with a contractor employing 100 or more people, conditions of the
Federal Contractors Program for Employment Equity must be met.50
These are just two examples of the mandatory requirements 5' placed on
the private party contracting with the State, requirements which have the
146. Churchill Falls (Nfld. S.C.), supra, note 129 at 243; Millet, supra, note 128 at 570.
147. See also P. McDonald, "Contradictory Government Action: Estoppel of Statutory
Authorities", [1979] 17 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 160.
148. Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra, note 1 at 37, footnotes omitted.
149. These provisions relate to the offenses of: frauds on the government (s. 21), selling or
purchasing office (s. 124), and selling defective goods to her Majesty (s. 418).
150. Federal Government's Treasury Board Manual, clause .4.2.5.
151. Clause .4.1 of the Treasury Board Manual makes mandatory the policy requirements
contained in it for "all departments and agencies, including departmental corporations and
branches designated as departments for the purposd of the FinancialAdministration Act." See
also clause .3 of the Manual.
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very real effect of altering the law through means other than a legislative
instrument. Control over the State's internal organization thus becomes
a source of both real and potential power. But as the private law model has
no mechanism to detect this reality, it accords it no formal significance.
c. Conditions of contracting
Another manifestation of State power and source of control over bargain-
ing is found in the standard form contracts which set out the terms and
conditions of the State contract. Like royal prerogatives and the Govern-
ment's internal management policies, the standard form contract exerts
influence over the quality of the State's contractual promise.
It is, of course, easy to exaggerate the oppressive implications of the
standard-form contract. As Trebilcock points out, use of.the standard form
may not be evidence of concentration of market power but rather, a desire
to reduce transaction costs and "facilitate the conduct of trade.'152
Nonetheless, while it is true that most individuals are not forced to
contract with the State, 53 the State is an enormous consumer and a
potentially lucrative source of income. 54 Being such a substantial con-
sumer functions to give the Government a good deal of control over its
obligations and liabilities and those which the individual is asked to
assume. Indeed:
The Government is a large scale purchaser and is often able to impose its
own terms on a contractor. There is no special body of case law governing
the standard term contract; the quasi-legislative character of such contracts
should be recognized and their terms subject to a measure of judicial
review. 155
Nor has the extent and effect of governmental control over the
contracting process escaped those with experience in delivering procured
goods and services to the federal government. Grant Murray of IBM
Canada Ltd. has observed, as recently as 1986, the government's "great
reluctance to accept contract terms which are more in keeping with the
152. M. Trebilcock, The CommonLawofRestraintofTrade (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 165.
153. Further, under certain relatively rare circumstances, the individual is in a superior
bargaining position, as in times of war and national shortage. See Mewett, supra, note 62 at
233-234.
154. See supra, at footnote 3 for the estimated value of procurement contracts entered into by
the Federal Government and its Crown corporations in 1984.
155. H. Street and R. Brazier, eds., de Smith: Constitutional andAdministrative Law, 5th ed.,
(Harmondsworth: Pequin Books, 1985) at 630. The adhesive, legislative quality of the standard
form government contract has been remarked upon by other legal scholars as well. See H.
Street, Government Liability: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1953) at99 and 104 and Friedmann, Lawin a ChangingSociety, 2nded., (NewYork: Columbia
University Press, 1972) at 403.
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terms and conditions commonly found in the commercial marketplace,"' 56
thus placing an onerous burden on the private contracting party. 57 Take
Murray's example of the federal government's short-form standard
contract which he finds to be deficient for not addressing the issue of
patent indemnification. It is industry practice, he notes, to insert a patent
indemnification clause in contracts for the supply of data processing
machinery because there are "literally thousands of patents relating to
information-handling technology and, even with the best of intentions, it
is possible to overlook a patent."'58 The federal government, however,
will not allow a comparable clause. Rather: "it vigorously resists giving
the supplier this escape and insists that the supplier leave the equipment
in place and also indemnify the Government against all claims."'' 9
Other standard clauses, particularly the termination of convenience
clause, can prove needlessly onerous on the private contracting party and
unreasonably protective of the Government's interests - yet they consti-
tute an ingredient in the standard short form contract. And when the
termination clause is invoked the contractor is only entitled to be
reimbursed for actual costs.
reasonably and properly incurred ... but in no case shall such reimburse-
ment exceed the Contract price or shall the Contract have claim for
damages, compensation, loss of profit or otherwise, except as herein
provided.' 6
This is not, I suggest, a clause one would readily agree to because it makes
no effort to assess and distribute risk - it is all borne by the contractor.16'
Murray may well be correct when he describes the procurement process
in the following terms:
156. "Contracting with the Government" in the Law Society of Upper Canada Continuing
Legal Education Series: Doing Business with Government (Toronto: LSUC, 1986) at K-4.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid. at K-13.
159. Ibid. at K-14.
160. See Supply and Services Canada Short Form DSS-MAS 9329 (General Conditions for
the purchase of commercially available off the shelf goods and services.)
The effect of this clause is to disentitle the contracting individual from securing damages from
the government for loss of expectation and loss of opportunity, to name two heads of damage.
In addition, if the individual had entered into sub-contracts and then went into breach because
the government invoked this clause, he or she could not look to the government for
indemnification of any third-party liability.
161. In fact, under French public law - known as droit administratif - termination for
convenience clauses are classified as a clause exorbitante because they "confer rights or
impose obligations upon the parties quite unlike in their nature those which anyone would
freely agree to in the context of civil or commercial law." See L. Brown and J. Gamer, French
AdministrativeLaw (3rd ed) (London: Butterworths, 1983) at 88, quoting Stein, CE 20 October
1950.
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The system has been kept in place largely to give the Government the best
of all possible worlds. On the one hand, the Government wants-to procure
everything at the lowest possible price ... preferably lower than the lowest
commercial price. On the other hand, if some problem develops with one
of the Government's contractors, politicians want to be in a position to
stand up in the House or before the media and say that the government has
not compromised its legal rights in any way and is, therefore, able to pursue
all legal remedies. 62
Because standard form contracts tend to be weighted heavily and
explicitly in favour of the Government, and because contractual claims
against the federal government can be handled by the federal Department
of Supply and Services Contracts Settlement Board, 63 there is little
reported case law on disputes arising out of these contracts. In instances
where disputes are reported, the outcome is generally favourable to the
government. Take, for example, the Federal Court of Appeal decision in
Government of Canada v. Construction JRL Ltee.164 In that case, the
respondent contracted to build on a riverbank at a fixed price. Its costs
went well over estimates because of soil instability previously known to
the Government. At trial, the Court held that while the Government had
no contractual liability for the cost overruns, it was liable for failing to
warn the contractor of possible problems. The Federal Court of Appeal,
however, reversed this decision as the subject contract excluded extra
payments to the Contractor unless agreed to by the Owner's engineer
pursuant to clause 12(l)(a) of the General Conditions.' 61
That the State is well positioned through its standard form contracts is
also evidenced inEntreprises de TransportMarcelBoivin Inc. v. Canada166
which regards the matter from a civil law perspective. In that case, the
plaintiff contracted to collect garbage from federal government sites. The
Government became dissatisfied, however, because the contractor left
some sites messy, on several occasions failed to pickup the garbage at all,
and was difficult to contact by telephone. On the basis of these deficien-
cies, the Government terminated the contract.
General Condition DSS-9076 (P-4) provided the following penalties
for default:
162. Supra, note 156 at K-4.
163. According to Arrowsmith, supra, note 3, though the Board's decision is not binding on
the individual contractor, they are accepted in over 90 percent of the cases even though the
results are adverse to the contractor in 50 percent of the cases, at 79, footnote 76. Arrowsmith
does not provide a figure on the number of cases which are resolved on the basis of an ex gratia
payment.
164. (1983), 52 N.R. 1 (F.C.A.).
165. Ibid., at 3 and 9.
166. (1989), 44 B.L.R. 208 (F.C.T.D.)
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16. Default
(1) If the Contractor is in default in carrying out any of the terms,
conditions, covenants or obligations of the Contract ... the Minister may,
by giving notice in writing to the Contractor, terminate the whole or any
part of the Contract. Upon giving of such notice the Contractor shall have
no claim for any further payment save as hereinafter provided, but shall
remain liable to Her Majesty by reason of the default or occurrence upon
which such notice was based.' 67
Clause 15 entitled the party to a terminated contract to be paid "a
reasonable price for performing any of the work that has been completed
at the time of termination and other cost directly incurred ... but in no
event shall the aggregate of the price paid ... exceed the total Contract
price. '
168
The plaintiff argued that its defaults were not particularly serious and
that the termination was accordingly wrongful. The Court was unsympa-
thetic:
Seen from the standpoint of a contract for services between private parties,
such clauses may undoubtedly appear draconian; but it should be noted
that this is an administrative contract, where a public authority has decided
to award a contract to ensure the proper functioning of a public service.
While the government body is acting in the public interest, the other
contracting party is acting in a private interest. .. .' [Diefault [in adminis-
trative contracts] will be judged with a strictness and severity unknown to
private law.'169
The Court found that, as the government had terminated in accordance
with all the contractual terms, the plaintiff's action had to fail. 170
By its in-house policies, procedures and standard form contracts, the
Government seeks to protect the public interest. This is in accord with
liberal democratic theory. Yet, evidence and commonsense show that
Government officials will also try to secure unreasonably favourable
terms in order to protect themselves from the consequences of seceding
any of the State's superior bargaining position.'' The private law model
cannot accord any legal importance to this basic reality, however: it is
content with its strong presumption of equality and knowledge that no
167. Ibid., at 213.
168. Ibid., at 214.
169. Ibid., at 214-215, quoting with approval P. Lemieux, Les Contrats de l'Administration
Federal, Provincial et Municipale (Sherbrooke: Revue du Droit Universit6 de Sherbrooke,
1981) on government contracts.
170. Ibid at 215-216.
171. As Cohen points out, supra note I at 398, it may be dangerous to assume that:
"the bureaucracy is a benign entity simply fulfilling the wishes of its political or
command masters. Other views are quite different. In these an activist, independent
bureaucracy shapes state policy, and then actively implements that policy to achieve
bureaucratically defined objects [footnotes omitted]."
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one is generally forced to contract with the State. 1 2 This, in turn, may
mean that the private law model ignores too much.
3. Temporally Fixed Source of Contractual Obligations
As earlier references to Treitel have shown, the private law model
recognizes that a contract comes into existence upon acceptance of an
offer: it is at this moment that rights and obligations of the parties solidify
legally. With the obvious exceptions of fraud, estoppel, duress and
misrepresentation, and other matters going to consent, the nature of any
antecedent relationships between the parties is legally insignificant.
There are good reasons for this general proposition within the context
of private, commercial relationships between individuals. The rule is
intended to provide a measure of certainty in the market place, to respect
the individual's right to control effectively the nature and extent of the
obligations he or she assumes, to put limits on what can and cannot be
demanded by the other party. But there are equally good reasons for
rejecting the application of this proposition to the State contract. Liberal
democratic theory posits an inalienable relationship between individual
and State, on the one hand, and State and society on the other. These
relationships place mandatory obligations on the State even when it is in
a contractual relationship: it must continue to demonstrate concern and
respect for individual autonomy; it must seek to discover and act upon the
common good.
The private law model has no mechanism to enforce obligations from
these pre-existing relationships because it locates obligation in the
moment of acceptance only. To the extent that the private law model
cannot accommodate a central component of liberal democratic theory
makes it ill-suited to its task of defining State liability.
4. Defences to Liability
In addition to the defences which flow from its prerogative powers,
control over inhouse procedure, or terms drafted in its favour, the State
has unique defences to relieve it from contractual liability.
172. As another instance of State control over contractual terms, one can look to the
Government of Alberta's standard petroleum and natural gas license which empowers the
Government unilaterally to amend through legislation. The standard lease provides that the
license is bound by the provision of the Mines and Minerals Act of Alberta as amended from
time to time or any replacement thereof as well as by all present and future subordinate
legislation.
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a. Doctrine of executive necessity
There is some authority for the proposition that, as an incident of the
Crown's common law power to contract, the State can invoke the doctrine
of executive necessity to negate the existence of any alleged contract and
so the consequences of an allegedbreach. InRederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite
v. The Queen,173 the Court held that the British Crown's undertaking not
to confiscate the plaintiff's merchant ship - which would otherwise to
subject to seizure, on the ground that it was a foreign ship entering a
British port during wartime - did not produce a contract because:
it is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action,
which must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community
when the question arises. It cannot by contract hamper its freedom of
action in matters which concern the welfare of the State.74
Accordingly, when the British government seized the plaintiff's ship for
undisclosed reasons, the plaintiff was left without a remedy as the Court
found there to be no contract between the litigants.
If the court in The Amphitrite is correct, it is difficult to imagine how
the Government would ever be legally constrained by its apparent
contractual undertakings to do or not do certain acts. It is difficult to
imagine how Government, unless it chose to submit itself, could ever be
held civilly liable for failing to meet obligations which, absent this
doctrine, would be contractual ones. Indeed, the case has the effect of
stripping away contractual bindingness as every contract, no matter how
modest, inconsequential and fleeting, constitutes a fetter on future
executive discretion.
The decision has been roundly criticized 75 on these and related
grounds - so thoroughly in fact, that little would be gained by duplicating
173. [1921] 3 X.B. 500,
174. Ibid., at 503.
175. Critical commentary on The Amphitrite is legion. See Peter Hogg, supra, note 21 at 171-
172 and his footnote 51 at where he cites critical discussion by C. Turpin, Government
Contracts (London: Penguin, 1972) at 19-25; M. Aronson and H. Whitmore, Public Torts and
Contracts (Sydney: Law Book Co., 1982) at 194-202; R. Dussault and L. Bourgeat, Adminis-
trative Law: A Treatise (trans. Murray Rankin) (Toronto: Carswell, 1986); S. Arrowsmith,
supra note 3 at 125-130; Campbell, "Agreements about the Exercise of Statutory Powers"
(1971) 45 Aus. LU. 338.
See too Mason J.'s comment inAnsett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd., supra, note
75 at 74 that The Amphitrite's statement of law "has been criticized on the ground that is
expressed too generally and so it is."Also at 74, Mason J. refers to adverse commentary on The
Amphitrite in Sir William Holdsworth, "A Casebook on Constitutional Law," (1929) 45 L.Q.R.
166-167; H. Street, Government Liability, supra note 155 at 98-99; J.D.B. Mitchell, Contractd
of Public Authorities (1954) at 57 et seq.; P.W. Hogg, "The Doctrine of Executive Authority
in the Law of Contract," (1970) 44 Aus. L.J. at 338; J.E. Richardson, "The Executive Power
of the Commonwealth" in L. Zines, ed. Commentaries on theAustralian Constitution (Sydney:
Butterworths, 1977) at 76-80.
Finally, see Graham Zelleck's recitation of commentators opposed t6 Rowlatt J.'s pronounce-
ment, in "Government Beyond Law" (1985), Public Law 283 at 286, n. 28.
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the debate here - especially since The Amphitrite has never been fol-
lowed "'76 and shows no signs of life.
b. The Doctrine of State necessity
The doctrine of state necessity, according to the Supreme Court of
Canada, "provides a justification for otherwise illegal conduct of a
government during a public emergency." 77 It was this doctrine which
empowered the Supreme Court of Canada - in the name of the Rule of
Law, legal order, and the avoidance of a "legislative void"7 8 - to give
Manitoba laws temporary effect notwithstanding theirjudicially declared
unconstitutionality for failure to comply with section 23 of the Manitoba
Act. 17
9
While there are no cases addressing this point, it seems certain that
Government could invoke the doctrine of state necessity as a means of
justifying what would otherwise be an illegal disregard of its obligation
to perform contractual undertakings or pay Court ordered damages in lieu
thereof. Although successful invocation of the doctrine would be contin-
gent on the existence of a "public emergency," it is nonetheless a
powerful, final-answer defence which belies the analogical premise.
c. The State cannot act outside of a statute which limits its
contractual powers
Where a contract is statutorily governed, the mandatory requisites of
that Statute must be met or the contract does not come into existence.180
As the Australian High Court puts it:
When the administration of particular functions of government is regu-
lated by statute and the regulatiofi expressly or impliedly touches the
power of contracting, all statutory conditions must be observed and the
power no doubt is no wider than the statute contemplates.'
176. Hogg, supra, note 21 at 172. On this point, Graham Zelleck, ibid at 286 declares:
[The doctrine of executive necessity] was constructed on the most fragile foundations,
it is supported by neither previous nor subsequent authority, it is possibly obiter and it
has been condemned by virtually every commentator and criticized by Denning 1. (as
he then was) as long ago as 1948 [footnotes deleted].
My research shows no Canadian decision even considering, let alone following TheAmphitrite.
177. Per Chief Justice Dickson, Reference Re: Language Rights under the Manitoba Act,
1870, supra note 19 at 29-30.
178. Ibid., at 33.
179. Section 23 required Manitoba's laws to be enacted, printed and published in both French
and English and this successive Manitoba legislatures had failed to do.
180. CAE Industries Ltd., supra note 12 at 371.
181. State of New South Wales v. Bardolph (1934), 52 C.L.R. 455 at 496 (Aus. H.C.), quoted
with approval in CAE Industries Ltd., ibid and by the privy Council in Cudgen Rutile (No. 2)
Pty. Ltd. v. Chalk, [1975] A.C. 520, per Lord Wilberforce.
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If mandatory statutory conditions to a contract are not met the indi-
vidual is left without remedy - even if he or she were ignorant of the
limitations 812 - unless there are the grounds to invoke a remedy based in
restitution.'83 The general principle constitutes a defence which can work
hardship to the individual.
It is of course true that parties to a purely private contract must also
comply with all applicable statutory and common law requirements
necessary to the creation of a contract. To this extent, the individual-State
analogy holds. But the State contract is generally more heavily regulated
because, in the modem Canadian State, there is a "separation of owner-
ship from control and power, which is characterized by the development
of bureaucracies."' 4 As bureaucratic control and power constitute such
a large part of the State, statutory supervision is required to ensure
compliance with the requirements of governmental accountability. And
to the extent that statutory compliance is not seen, the individual is left
vulnerable.
In Lake Champlain and St. Lawrence Ship Canal Co. v. The King,'85
for example, the plaintiff spent a considerable sum of money in reliance
on a grant to be awarded to it pursuant to a special Act passed for this very
purpose. This Act provided that the plaintiff's plans for the construction
and operation of a canal were to be submitted for approval by the
182. The Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen v. Woodburn (1898), 29 S.C.R. 112 at 123
held:
It is perfectly clear that a contractor dealing with the Government is chargeable with
notice of all statutory limitations placed upon the power of public officers. Where a
statute expressly defines the power, it is notice to all the world.
183. Courts have held that where a contract fails for statutory non-compliance, the individual
is entitled to a quantum meruit. See May v. R. (1913), 14 Ex.C.R. 341 at 346; National Dock
and Dredging Corpn v. The King, [1929] Ex.C.R. 40 at 54 (where no contract but Crown
accepts the plaintiff's work, quantum meruit applies). See too Walsh Advertising Co. Ltd. v.
The Queen, [1962] Ex.C.R. 115 where the Crown was ordered to pay a quantum meruit for
adopting some of the results of the plaintiff's service even though the contract itself failed for
non-compliance with mandatory statutory provisions, at 130. Finally, see The Gresham Blank
Book Company v. The King (1912), 14 Ex.C.R. 236 at 240. The plaintiffs in these cases would
not, of course, be entitled to any compensation for expectation interest or loss of opportunity.
Where the contract fails for statutory non-compliance, a remedy in unjust enrichment may be
possible if the plaintiff can bring itself within the test articulated by Mr. Justice Dickson in
Rathwellv.Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436 at455: there mustbe an enrichment, acorresponding
deprivation, and an "absence of any juristic reason - such as a contract or disposition of law
- for the enrichment."
Note that in City of Moncton v. H.E. Carson & Sons Ltd. (1982), 138 D.L.R. (3d) 596
(N.B.C.A.), the respondent supplied goods and services to the City of Moncton on request of
the City's engineer. The City refused to pay the account because the alleged contract did not
meet statutorily mandatory conditions, including the signature of the mayor and clerk. In its
action on the contract, the respondent was unsuccessful due to statutory non-compliance, at
603. It appears, however, that no claim in unjust enrichment was made.
184. Cohen, supra, note 1 at 392.
185. (1919) 54 S.C.R. 461.
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Governor-in-Council prior to commencement of construction. The Gov-
ernor-in-Council refused its approval, not because of problems with the
plans submitted but because the Government had, between the passing of
the legislation and the submitting of the plans, decided against the
necessity for building a canal. Accordingly, it declined to give its consent
on "the high political grounds of public policy."'' 6 Notwithstanding a
strong dissent by the Chief Justice," 7 the majority found that no contract
came into existence because the statutorily mandatory approval was not
obtained.
d. The fact of legislative power
The State has unequivocal control over the outcome of a contractual
dispute through exercise of its legislative powers. Hence, if legislation is
passed making it an "imperative duty of the Government" to terminate a
contractual agreement, "the Crown... [incurs] no liability ... by perform-
ing that statutory duty.'' 88 Similarly, if legislation creating apublic office
is repealed, then the office-holder no longer has a contract to sue on and
thus is without remedy even when terminated without cause, without
notice, and without payment in lieu.189
Further, the State is competent to overturn a judicial decision by
simply passing a law to the contrary. Such legislation - subject to its
constitutional validity - thereby has the effect of removing all legal
consequences of Governmental liability. As Zelleck asserts:
The Government has a truly wonderful magic wand.... When it is waved
with the incantation "Parliamentary Sovereignty," a great and mysterious
and sometimes terrible thing called an Act of Parliament is brought into
being which can turn right into wrong,justice into injustice and subvert the
rule of law.Y9
186. Ibid at 477.
187. As the Chief Justice notes, ibid at 467:
That the claim is a meritorious one, seems clear. It would surely be an injustice if the
suppliants after incurring large expenditures on the faith of a Parliamentary grant were
to be deprived of all their rights not through any defect in their plans but because the
Government did not approve of the undertaking and dissenting from the decision of
Parliament could by withholding approval of the plans could prevent altogether the
carrying out of the works.
188. Windsor & Annapolis Rwy Co. v. The Queen, supra, note 11 at 616. Note that in this case,
the court found that legislation invoked by the Crown as authority for terminating the contract
at issue had no such effect.
189. In Wicks v. A.G. of B.C., [1975] 4 W.W.R. 283 (B.C.S.C.) the plaintiff's statutory
position was repealed by an Act of the British Columbia legislature. When the plaintiff brought
an action for breach of contract against the Government, his action was dismissed on the theory
that, upon repeal of the statutory position, the contract of employment no longer existed.
Accordingly, there was nothing to left to sue on. The Court found that the plaintiff's only hope
was for an ex gratia payment from the Crown, at 289.
190. Graham Zelleckosupra, note 175 at 288.
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Zelleck cites several examples, though none involving a State contract,
wherein the British government passed legislation to overturn the effect
of a judicial decision:
Probably the best known example of [this kind of] retrospective legislation
... denying a successful litigant the redress to which he [or she] had been
entitled was the War Damage Act 1965, which deprived the Burmah Oil
Company of the compensation awarded to it by the House of Lords in
respect of the destruction of its installations in Burma during the second
world war so that they would not fall into the hands of the advancing
Japanese forces.1 91
While it cannot be said that use of a legislative strategy to avoid liability
is frequent, or utterly immune from attack,192 it is a powerful weapon in
the hands of the State alone. It means that, at the end of the day,
Government is only bound by a contract if it wants to be. Indeed, the fact
of the State's legislative power reduces the resonance in the judicial
pronouncement that "it is the duty of the Crown and of very branch of the
executive to abide by and obey the law."'193 At the very most, it is an
admonition.
V. The Model's Success
We have seen that the underlying object in applying the private law model
to the State contract is protection of the individual from overarching State
power. The model's underlying assumption is the presence of a private
analogue. My conclusion is that the model cannot justify its assumption
and so cannot attain its object. Indeed, deference to the private law model
of State liability prevents the development of a Canadian public law
which is consistent with liberal democratic theory. On the one hand, the
model distorts critical components in the State contract. It refuses to
191. Ibid., at 290.
192. It may be the case that where the State acts unlawfully to deprive a individual of his or
her rights, legislation purporting to shelter the government would not be applied by the Court.
In the Alberta decision of ChinookFarmsLtd. v. Alberta Government (1986),48 Alta. L.R. 337
(Q.B.), for example, the corporate plaintiff sought an injunction against the Government to
restrain it from continuing to flood its farmland. The Crown argued that section 17 of the
Proceedings Against The Crown Act R.S.A. 1980 c. P-18 prevented the Court from granting
an injunction against the Crown. Certainly, this is what the words of the Act would imply.
Notwithstanding, MacLean J. rejected the Crown argument, at 338, on the following basis:
The Crown and its officers and ministers cannot shield themselves under s. 17 of the
Proceedings Against the Crown Act in matters where they have acted in an unlawful
manner which results in depriving an individual of his [or her] rights.
It may be the case that similar reasoning would apply where the State passes legislation
excusing itself from liability for a contractual breach. But as such an argument conflicts with
the concepts of Parliamentary sovereignty, it is by no means clear that the argument would be
successful.
193. Per Sir George Farwell, The Eastern Trust Company, supra, note 9 at 759.
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recognize ongoing obligations arising from the antecedent individual-
State and State-society relationships because the model locates all
obligations in the moment of acceptance. It misconstrues the imbalance
of power between the individual and State because it recognizes only
exaggerated forms of inequality. It accords little formal recognition of the
State's duties of governance because what the model looks for is
"freedom of contract" tested only against the standard of uncoerced
consent. It cannot account for a self-interested bureaucracy. It fails to
recognize the significance of special State defences and so cannot
comprehend that contracts never fully bind the State.
On the other hand, when public law principles are confronted by the
Court because they are inescapable, the result is unsystematic and
dissipative. They are seen as exceptions which prove the rule rather than
as evidence of an independent area of law requiring disciplined attention.
As a direct consequence, there is still no definitive judicial position on
whether the executive owes a duty of fairness in all its contractual
dealings. There is still no consistent attempt to develop content to the
meaning of that duty. There is insufficient attention paid to when and why
the State can legitimately invoke prerogatives as well as to the conse-
quences of prerogatives on individual rights. There is no sustained
attempt to enforce the State's rights and obligations without making the
individual unreasonably vulnerable and vice versa.
The contradiction generated by this private law strategy is significant.
In seeking to respect and protect individual autonomy, our public law
system claims to be, for the most part, a private law system. In accord with
Dicey, everyone therefore is "subject to the ordinary law of the realm and
amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals."1 94 But a private law
strategy produces a public law system in spite of itself and one which -
because it is unknowing - is not equipped to do its job. It generates
uncertainty because its sources of law are both numerous and unstruc-
tured. Because it has no plan, it cannot develop "general principles and
legal categories ... which attempt to take account of the inherent differ-
ences of position between public authorities and private individuals."' 95
For the same reason, it is unable to generate a rational "synthesis of public
law by relating judgements to principles derived from a coherent and
evolving philosophy." 196 As a result, our "public law" system heightens
the vulnerability of the individual instead of reducing it - an ironic and
counter-productive result.
194. Dicey, supra, note 20 at 193.
195. Dyson, supra, note 48 at 233.
196. Ibid.
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Given the impoverished conclusions to which the private model leads,
it becomes critical to explore alternatives. Of assistance would be a model
of Canadian public law which acknowledges the differences between
individual and State 97 and seeks to accommodate those differences
within the context of liberal democratic theory, the Rule of Law and other
Canadian constitutional imperatives. What is required is a model of
liability which confronts, instead of concealing, the competition between
public and private interests inevitably present.19 What is required is a
model which recognizes its own political implications and so the essential
role of theory. In short, Canada requires a public law system which
recognizes itself as such. 199
197. Accord Cohen, supra, note 1 at 381 and the Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra
note 1 at 26-27, and 59-60.
198. There are at least three sets of competing interests in the State contract which require legal
resolution: that of the individual contractor who has undertaken to the State to provide goods
or services, that of society for whose benefit the contract was entered, and that of the officials
who act on behalf of the State in the contractual process. Of course, theoretically, the
bureaucrats' interest should be coextensive with the State's interest but, in practice, this is not
always the case. As Cohen points out, supra note 1 at 398, it may be dangerous to assume that
the bureaucracy is a "benign entity simply fulfilling the wishes of its political or command
masters." And as William Bishop comments in "A Theory of Administrative Law' (1990), 19
Journal of Legal Studies 489 at 501:
The bureaucrat, often lacking any sharply defined or measurable goals, will make at
least some decisions in his own interest, rather than in the interest of the public, as
defined by law, that he has been hired to serve.
199. A public law strategy is already employed in several European countries including
France, Italy, Belgium, certain Latin American countries influenced by France, and, to a lesser
extent, Germany. See W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, supra note 155 at 402. Such
a strategy is favoured, in varying degrees by the Law Reform Commission of Canada as well
as by numerous legal scholars. Indeed, The Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note
1, calls for administrative law with a "distinctive meaning" at 26-27, and one which would
recognize the differences between individual and State, at 59-60; Cohen, supra note 1, notes
that "private law doctrine is an inadequate tool to resolve individual-state conflict," at 381; H.
Street, supra note 155 at 82 argues that Government contracts should to some extent be
governed "by different legal rules" and at 185 he suggests that "Anglo-American countries
ought to copy the French by subjecting all administrative authorities to a-uniform law;" L.
Brown and J. Garner, supra note 161 at 131 note that "the English failure to recognize the need
for a special administrative contract has led not only to infelicities and inelegancies, but on
occasion results in positive injustice:" Alan Mewett, supra note 62 at 246 remarks that
government contracts have too many unique characteristics to "make a complete assimilation
between them and the ordinary contract between private persons. ... Confusion will
inevitably arise if the features of government contracts are explained and applied according to
principles and terminology of private law." In sum, and as Friedmann asserts, supra note 155
at 407:
the case for open recognition, and appropriate regulation, of contracts between
government and otherpublic authorities on one part, and private individuals on the other
is overwhelming.
